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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case presents the question of whether, by simply not filing a third party claim under 
Idaho Code § 11-203, a secured creditor forfeits its perfected security interest in certain property 
to a judgment creditor who levied and sold the property without first obtaining the secured 
creditor's authorization. 
PlaintifflRespondent KeyBank National Association ("KeyBank") has a validly perfected 
security interest in certain property (the "Collateral") owned by Tri-Steel Construction Company, 
Inc. ("Tri-Steel"), arising out of two $150,000 loans made by KeyBank to Tri-Steel in 2007 and 
2008. KeyBank sued Tri-Steel for breach of the loans and obtained a default judgment on 
June 1,2010 for $296,500.10. The judgment also provided that KeyBank was entitled to a writ 
of possession by which the sheriff would seize the Collateral and put it in KeyBank's possession. 
While KeyBank: was in the process of obtaining its judgment against Tri-Steel, 
Defendant! Appellant PAL I, LLC ("PAL"), an unsecured judgment creditor, caused the Madison 
County sheriff to levy upon and notice a Sheriff s sale of the Collateral. Despite repeated 
communication by KeyBank with counsel for PAL and the Sheriff's Office requesting they 
postpone the sale or hold all sale proceeds in a trust account for KeyBank, the Collateral was sold 
on June 9, 2010, and $16,884.41 was disbursed to PAL as sale proceeds. 
PAL does not contest that KeyBank has a perfected security interest with superior priority 
to its own judgment against Tri-Steel. PAL, however, asserts KeyBank entirely forfeited its 
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interest in the Collateral by failing to file a third party claim under Idaho Code § 11-203. Due to 
the rules of statutory construction and the protection and dignity afforded perfected security 
interests in property under Idaho law, the absence of a third party claim under Idaho Code § 11-
203 does not forfeit KeyBank's secured and perfected interest in this property. 
B. Statement of Facts 
On April 16, 2007, KeyBank loaned Tri-Steel $150,000 (the "2007 Loan"). On 
December 5, 2008, KeyBank loaned Tri-Steel an additional $150,000 (the "2008 Loan").) As 
security for the 2007 and 2008 Loans, Tri-Steel executed certain commercial security 
agreements, which pledged certain property owned by Tri-Steel as Collateral? On April 23, 
2007, KeyBank filed a UCC Financing Statement with the Idaho Secretary of State perfecting its 
interest in the 2007 CollateraL Likewise, on February 23,2010, KeyBank filed a UCC Financing 
Statement with the Idaho Secretary of State perfecting its interest in the 2008 CollateraL3 
KeyBank brought suit against Tri-Steel in District Court of the Seventh Judicial District 
for the State ofIdaho in and for the County of Madison, as Case No. CV-I0-191 (the "Original 
Lawsuit") for breach of the 2007 and 2008 Loans.4 In April 2010, KeyBank learned that PAL 
had caused the Madison County Sheriff to serve a writ of execution and notice of attachment 
against certain property belonging to Tri-Steel. 
I R Vol. I, pp. 14-15, " 12, 16; see also R Supp. VoL I, p. 26B, , 2 (incorporating and restating 
allegations in the Complaint). 
2 R Vol. I, pp. 14-15",13-14,17-18. 
3 R VoL I, pp. 14-15,"15, 19. 
4 R Vol. I, p. 15, , 20; see also R Supp. Vol. I, p. 25, , 3. 
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On April 28, 2010, KeyBank's counsel sent a letter to PAL's counsel stating that the 
property PAL sought to seize was KeyBank's secured Collateral.5 KeyBank informed PAL that 
it had no right to seize or sell the Collateral, and that if any sale occurred, KeyBank would retain 
all rights it had in the Collateral, including a right to the proceeds from the sale.6 
KeyBank's Original Lawsuit was reduced to a default judgment on June 1, 20IO, in the 
amount of $296,500.10 plus interest and attorneys' fees. The judgment also provided that 
KeyBank was entitled to a writ of possession against Tri-Steel directing the Sheriff to put 
KeyBank in possession of the Collateral and authorizing KeyBank, upon its receipt of said 
collateral, to utilize its non-judicial remedies under the Uniform Commercial Code.7 
On or about June 4, 20IO, KeyBank sent the Madison County Sheriffs Office a writ of 
execution for the Collateral and instructed the Sheriff to seize the Collateral.8 KeyBank also 
requested orally and in writing that the Sheriffs Office and PAL postpone the sale scheduled for 
June 9, 20IO or hold all sale proceeds in a trust account for KeyBank.9 Despite KeyBank's 
objections, the sale proceeded as scheduled. According to an accounting provided by the 
Sheriffs Office, $16,884.41 in sale proceeds was disbursed to PAL (the "Sale Proceeds"). 10 
5 R Vol. I, pp. 15-16, ~~ 21-22. 
6 R Vol. I, p. 16, ~ 22; see also R Supp. Vol. I, p. 9, ~ 3. 
7 R Vol. I, p. 16, ~~ 24-25; see also R Supp. VoL I, p. 25, ~ 3. 
8 R Vol. I, p. 16, ~ 27; see also R Supp. Vol. I, p. 9, ~ 4. 
9 R Vol. I, pp. 16-18, ~ 28-32; see also R Supp. Vol. I, p. 9, ~ 4. 
10 R Vol. I, p. 18, ~ 35-36; see also R Supp. Vol. I, p. 25; ~ 4. 
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C. Course of Proceedings 
KeyBank Sues P Al to Recover the Sale Proceeds 
KeyBank initiated this lawsuit on August 16, 2011 to recover the Sale Proceeds disbursed to 
PAL. II KeyBank also alternatively sued the eight buyers from the sheriffs sale for possession of 
the Collateral. PAL answered the Complaint on September 27, 2010. 12 The eight buyers were 
never served and, after KeyBank was granted relief against PAL, KeyBank voluntarily dismissed 
those parties without prejudice on February 7, 2011. 13 
KeyBank Prevails on its Motion fOr Summary Judgment 
In October 2010, PAL and KeyBank filed cross motions for summary judgment. 14 
PAL's motion was supported by a memorandum and the affidavits of Suzanne Bagley and B.J. 
Driscoll, PAL's counsel. I5 KeyBank's motion was supported by two affidavits of Jeff Hart and 
two affidavits of Amber N. Dina, KeyBank's counsel. 16 
On December 23,2010, the District Court issued a Memorandum Decision that granted 
KeyBank summary judgment and denied PAL's competing motion, holding the "requirements of 
I.C. § 11-203 are not strictly enforceable against holders of a perfected security interest priority" 
and that KeyBank is entitled to the Sale Proceeds as a matter of law. 17 A judgment was entered 
II R Vol. I, p. 12. 
12 R Vol. I, p. 68. 
13 R Vol. I, p. 151. 
14 R Vol. I, pp. 73-74,96-97. 
15 R Vol. I, pp. 75-95. 
16 R Supp. Vol. I, pp. 1-26D. 
17 R Vol. I, pp. 108-115. 
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against PAL on January 3, 2011 "for the proceeds of the sheriff's sale in the amount of 
$16,884.41," plus interest at the statutory rate. 18 
The District Court Denies PAL's Motion for Reconsideration 
On January 11, 2011 , PAL filed a motion for reconsideration, asking the District Court 
to vacate the judgment and reverse its decision on the motions for summary judgment. 19 The 
District Court denied PAL's motion for reconsideration on February 25,2011.20 
On March 17, 2011 , PAL timely filed its notice of appeal.21 
PAL Fails in its Post-Judgment Attempt to Consolidate 
this Case with a Separate Lawsuit brought by Zions Bank 
After entry of judgment and notice of appeal, PAL was sued by another secured party, 
Zions First National Bank ("Zions Bank"), for these same proceeds of sale. In denying PAL's 
motion to consolidate the cases, the trial judge indicated that any predicament that PAL finds itself 
in as aresult was a tactical choice of PAL's own making, as it could have previously joined Zions 
Bank in the prior suit, saying: 
This case has already been adjudicated to a final judgment, which 
PAL has appealed. . .. Even if this Court has the authority to 
consolidate the cases at this late stage of the proceedings, it would 
decline to do so. Frankly, this type of last minute brinkmanship is 
not conducive to the just and timely resolution of cases. The Court 
sees no reason why it cannot reach a fair and consistent result in the 
second case that avoids double liability against PAL. Again, this is a 
18 R Vol. I, pp. 117-18. 
19 R Vol. I, pp. 121-22. 
20 R Vol. I, pp. 153-65. 
21 R Vol. I, pp. 166-69. 
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concern PAL could have addressed earlier by joining Zions Bank in 
this case, but it made the tactical choice not to do so. While the 
Court may understand PAL's reasons, all tactical choices have 
consequences.22 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
KeyBank restates the issues on appeal and adds additional issues as follows: 
1. Did the District Court err in holding Idaho Code § 11-203 is not intended to affect a 
secured creditor's perfected interest? 
2. Did the District Court err in holding a lienholder must comply with Idaho Code § 8-
506A prior to levying personal property subject to a security interest? 
3. Did the District Court err in holding its interpretation of Idaho Code § 11-203 does 
not violate PAL's right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment? 
4. Is KeyBank entitled to attorneys' fees on appeal under Idaho Code § 12-120(1), 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Appellate Ru1es 40 and 41? 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
PAL correctly states the law regarding the standard of review in connection with an 
LR.C.P. 56 motion for summary judgment. "On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary 
judgment, this Court employs the same standard as used by the district judge originally ruling on 
the motion." McFadden v. Sein, 139 Idaho 921, 923, 88 P.3d 740, 742 (2004) (quoting 
22 See pp. 9-10 of the Memorandum Decision on Post-Judgment Motions, a copy of which is 
attached to PAL's Motion to Augment the Clerk's Record, dated September 23, 2011. This 
Court entered an Order Granting Motion to Augment the Clerk's Record on September 28,2011. 
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Intermountain Forest Management, Inc. v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 136 Idaho 233, 235, 31 P.3d 
921, 923 (200 I )). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.c.P. 
56( c). "This court has free review over the construction of a statute ... " In re City of Shelly, 151 
Idaho 289, 255 P.3d 1175, 1177 (2011). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Whether or Not a Secured Creditor Files a Third Party Claim under Idaho 
Code § 11-203 Does Not Affect its Perfected Security Interest. 
1. Idaho Code § 11-203 is Primarily Intended to Protect Debtors, Not to 
Encumber the Rights of Secured Creditors. 
Idaho Code § 11-203 permits a debtor to claim an exemption in property that has been 
levied upon by delivering or mailing a completed "claim of exemption form" to the sheriff 
within fourteen days of service ofthe documents associated with the writ of execution. I.C. § 11-
203(a).23 The levying creditor thereafter has five days to contest the claim of exemption. I.C. § 
11-203(b). Idaho Code § 11-203 also states that within 14 days of receiving notice that property 
in which he has an interest has been levied upon by another creditor, a third party "shall prepare 
a written claim setting forth the grounds upon which he claims the property, and in the case of a 
secured party also stating the dollar amount of the claim." Under Idaho Code § 8-527, this same 
23 See Addendum to this Brief, attaching the full text ofIdaho Code § 11-203. 
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provision applies to a third party who has an interest in personal property that has been attached, 
garnished or executed upon. 
The Idaho legislature enacted Idaho Code § 11-203 in 1991 as part of a comprehensive 
reform to Idaho's execution and garnishment laws after they were found to violate debtors' 
constitutional due process rights by denying them an opportunity to claim their entitled 
exemptions. As explained in the Statement of Purpose for House Bill 264: 
In late December, 1990, Judge Harold Ryan of the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Idaho entered a judgment in Chaloux v. 
Killeen holding Idaho's laws on writs of execution and garnishment 
to be unconstitutional. Judge Ryan held that present law violates 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution by denying judgment debtors sufficient notice 
and opportunity to claim the exemptions to which they are entitled 
under state and federal law. In his judgment, Judge Ryan set forth a 
procedure to be followed by all Idaho sheriffs until such time as 
Idaho's law is amended in such a fashion that it will survive 
constitutional muster. The procedure provided in the judgment is 
cumbersome, expensive and time-consuming for both creditors and 
sheriffs. In order to satisfy constitutional concerns and to provide a 
more efficient procedure, this bill sets forth specific requirements 
for both sheriffs and creditors. 
The procedure set forth in this bill will ensure judgment 
debtors receive notice of a pending garnishment or other 
seizure of property in sufficient time to allow them to file a 
claim to the exemptions allowed them by law, either state or 
federal. Should the creditor disagree with the claim, the bill 
provides for an expedited hearing in the district court for the 
county in which the judgment arose. The bill also provides for the 
mailing of a list of the types of exemptions available to debtors 
generally to each judgment debtor or other person having an 
interest in the property being seized. 
Statement of Purpose, H 264 (Idaho 1991) (emphasis added). 
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As aptly noted by the District Court, "[tJhe claim of exemption statute is primarily intended 
to protect the rights of debtors-not to encllillber the rights of a perfected secured creditor.,,24 
Despite this clear purpose, PAL asserts Idaho Code § 11-203 imposes a mandatory requirement on 
secured creditors to file a third party claim of exemption within 14 days of receiving notice that 
their secured property has been levied. According to PAL, failure to file such a claim entirely 
divests a secured creditor of its interest in the levied property. PAL further argues Idaho Code § 28-
9-315, which states a "security interest .... continues in collateral notwithstanding sale ... unless 
the secured party authorized the disposition free of the security interest," has no bearing on the 
alleged "mandatory" requirements of Section 11-203. PAL's arguments are not supported by the 
facts of this case or the plain language of Sections 11-203 and 28-9-315, as discussed below. 
2. Idaho Code § 28-9-315 Provides that a Security Interest Continues 
Notwithstanding Sale, Unless the Secured Party Authorized the Sale. 
It is settled law that a "creditor holding a perfected security interest has priority over a 
subsequent execution on a judgment." Am. Jur. 2d Secured Transactions § 837. PAL does not 
dispute that KeyBank has a valid, perfected security interest with superior priority to PAL's 
judgment against Tri-Steel. However, in arguing the provisions ofIdaho Code § 11-203 impose a 
mandatory requirement on secured creditors to file a third party claim or lose their security interest, 
PAL ignores the critical distinction between exemption rights of debtors (which may be waived by 
failing to file a claim of exemption) and the vested property rights of secured creditors. 
24 R. Vol. I, p. 111. 
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An exemption is defined as a "privilege given to a judgment debtor by law, allowing the 
debtor to retain certain property without liability." Black's Law Dictionary 593 (7th ed. 1999). 
"Exemption laws are intended to ameliorate the harsh common-law rule making all of a debtor's 
property liable to execution for the payment of his debts by protecting specified property from 
forced sale." 31 Am. Jur. 2d Exemptions § 3 (2002)?5 "Exemption statutes are not designed to 
benefit or protect creditors", rather "exemption rights are personal to the debtor, and may be 
waived." 31 Am. Jur. 2d Exemptions § 1, 4 (2002). 
In contrast to exemption rights which may be waived by a debtor who fails to file a claim 
under Section 11-203, KeyBank, as a secured creditor, has a vested property right in the 
Collateral and Sale Proceeds. A secured creditor is a party "who has the right, on the debtor's 
default, to proceed against collateral and apply to it payment of the debt." Black's Law 
Dictionary 376 (7th ed. 1999). Idaho Code § 11-203 is not intended to affect a secured 
creditor's perfected interest, especially in light of Idaho Code § 28-9-315,26 which concerns a 
secured party's right upon the disposition of collateral and expressly states: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter and in section 28-
2-403(2): 
(1) A security interest or agricultural lien continues in collateral 
notwithstanding sale, lease, license, exchange or other disposition 
thereof unless the secured party authorized the disposition free of 
the security interest or agricultural lien; and 
25 For example, Idaho Code § 11-605 provides that an individual debtor is entitled to an 
exemption for $7,500 of personal property (including household goods, clothing, etc.) and an 
exemption for one motor vehicle up to $7,000. 
26 See Addendum to this Brief, attaching the full text of Idaho Code § 28-9-315. 
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(2) A security interest attaches to any identifiable proceeds of 
collateraL 
I.e. § 28-9-315 (emphasis added).27 
As noted by the District Court, this "statute clearly implies that a perfected security 
interest survives the failure to comply with I.C. § 11-203 because the repercussions for failing to 
file an exception are not provided for under I.C. § 11-203 or 28-2-403(2).,,28 PAL, however, 
asserts the District Court violated the rules of statutory construction by applying the Idaho Code 
§ 28-9-315 in a way that renders § 11-203 a nullity. As set forth below, PAL's arguments are 
without merit. 
a. Idaho Code § 11-203 Must he Analyzed in Conjunction with 
Idaho Code § 28-9-315. 
Idaho Code § 28-9-109(a)(I) states that Chapter 9, Title 28 (Idaho's Uniform Commercial 
Code for secured transactions), applies to a "transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a 
security interest or personal property or fixtures by contract" as well security interests created by 
27 Incidentally, "proceeds" as used in Idaho Code § 28-9-315(2) are likewise defined elsewhere in 
the Uniform Commercial Code to include "whatever is acquired upon the sale . . . or other 
disposition of the collateral." I.e. § 28-9-102(a)(64) (emphasis added). Hence, the basis for 
KeyBank's post-sale Complaint against PAL for the proceeds of sale. Other courts have 
recognized that an action for conversion will lie against a judgment creditor who exercises 
unauthorized acts of dominion over the collateral to the exclusion of the secured creditor's right 
to immediate possession upon default. See, e.g., Murdock v. Blake, 484 P.2d 164 (Utah 1971); 
Oregon Bank v. Fox, 699 P.2d 1147 (Or. Ct. App. 1985); Grocers Supply Co. v. Intercity 
Investment Properties, Inc., 795 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990). 
28 RVol.I,p. 111. 
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other means. PAL asserts Idaho Code § 28-9-315(a) is inapplicable to this case because "the levy 
on Tri-Steel's property is not a 'transaction' that 'creates' a security interest.,,29 
However, based on the plain language ofIdaho Code § 28-9-109 , Chapter 9, Title 28 of 
the Idaho Code (which includes Idaho Code § 28-9-315) does apply to KeyBank' s security 
interest in Tri-Steel's property. KeyBank's interest arose out of the commercial security 
agreements Tri-Steel executed in favor of KeyBank-i.e. a transaction that created a security 
interest in personal property by contract. Therefore, analysis of whether Idaho Code § 11-203 
provides a means by which a secured creditor like KeyBank may forfeit its security interest in 
levied property must be done in conjunction with Idaho Code § 28-9-315(a) which states a 
"security interest . . . . continues in collateral notwithstanding sale . . . or other disposition 
thereof unless the secured party authorized the disposition free of the security interest.,,30 
Notably, Article 9 itself defines a "lien creditor" as including someone who has a judgment lien 
and also utilizes that defined term in discussing priority between a security interest and a 
judgment lien. I.e. § 28-9-102(52) and I.e. § 28-9-317(a)(2)(A). 
29 PAL Appellant Brief, p. 30. 
30 PAL likewise misconstrues the language of Section 28-9-1 09( c )(2) that states Chapter 9 does 
not apply to the extent that "[a]nother statute of this state expressly governs the creation, 
perfection, priority or enforcement of a security interest created by this state or a governmental 
unit of this state ... " I.e. § 28-9-109( c )(2) (emphasis added). Idaho Code § 11-203 does not 
govern the "priority" or "enforcement" of security interests as alleged by PAL. Rather, the plain 
language of Section 11-203 does not expressly address the creation, perfection, priority or 
enforcement of security interests. As set forth in Section A.2.d. infra, had the legislature 
intended Idaho Code Section 11-203 to divest a secured creditor of its perfected security interest 
for failure to file a third party claim under Idaho Code Section 11-203, it would have expressly 
provided such a consequence. 
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b. KeyBank Did Not A uthorize PAL to Sell the Collateral Free of its 
Security Interest. 
PAL alternatively argues that if Idaho Code § 28-9-315(a)(1) applies to this case, 
KeyBank authorized the sale of its collateral by not filing a third party claim pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 11_203.31 This argument is not supported by Idaho law. See, e.g., Western Idaho 
Production Credit Ass'n v. Simplot Feed Lots, Inc., 106 Idaho 260, 263, 678 P.2d 52 (1984) 
(analyzing the language in former I.e. § 28-9-306(2), similar to the current language in Idaho 
Code § 28-9-315, providing that a "security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, 
exchange or disposition thereof unless the disposition was authorized by the secured party in the 
security agreement or otherwise.") (emphasis added). In Western Idaho, the creditor WIPCA 
held a perfected security interest in grain that was sold. The Court found that the security 
interest would be enforceable against the buyer unless the sale was authorized by WIPCA. The 
analysis then turned on whether or not the sale was authorized by WIPCA, with the court 
determining authorization did occur. Id. ("The course of dealing between WIPCA and the 
farmers and the policies of WIPCA clearly indicate the authorization to sell crops in which 
WIPCA held security interests and that WIPCA further authorized this particular sale by the 
farmers to Martin."). In the instant case, KeyBank' s actions, unlike the course of performance of 
the secured creditor in Western Idaho, did not affirmatively authorize the sale of its collateral. 
KeyBank expressly protested the sale in written and oral communication with counsel for PAL 
and the sheriffs office, warning that it if the sale occurred, KeyBank would retain all rights it had 
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in the Collateral, including a right to the proceeds from the sale. Moreover, there simply is no 
fair warning in the statutory language of Idaho Code § 11-203 that forfeiture of a valuable 
property right results from a failure to file a third party claim. 
c. PAL Fails to Establish the District Court Erred in Applying a 
General Statute Over a Specific Statute. 
PAL additionally argues that if Idaho Code § 28-9-315 applies in this case, then the 
District Court erred in applying "the general statute of Section 28-9-315" over "the specific 
statute of Section 11-203.,,32 While Idaho law does recognize that "a specific statute will 
control over a general or vague statute where the two are in contlict," PAL has failed to establish 
that Section 28-9-315 and Section 11-203 are conflict or that Section 28-9-315 (which expressly 
and specifically governs a secured parties rights on disposition of collateral), is vague. 
Mickelsen v. City of Rexburg, 101 Idaho 305, 307, 612 P.2d 542, 544 (1980). Under Idaho law, 
"[s]tatutory interpretation begins with the literal words of a statute." Haus/aden v. Knoche, 149 
Idaho 449, 235 P.3d 399,402 (2010). In examining the plain language of Sections 28-9-315 and 
11-203, the District Court noted that: 
While I.e. § 11-203 sets for the general rule for making a claim of 
exemption in all cases, I. C. § 28-9-315 sets forth the specific rules 
applicable to all secured interests. It sets forth situations where a 
secured interest survives a transfer or ownership, including a "sale, 
lease, license, exchange or other disposition." It hardly seems 
logical that to conclude that the Idaho legislature intended to grant 
31 PAL Appellant Brief, p. 31. 
32 PAL Appellant Brief, pp. 31-32. 
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the holder of a prior secured interest priority against every type of 
subsequent transfer, except for a levy pursuant to execution.33 
The District Court properly concluded that "both statutes are sufficiently specific, but 
about different areas of the law.,,34 
d. PAL Fails to Establish the District Court Erred in Applying an 
Older Statute Over a Newer Statute. 
"When interpreting statutes, this Court strives to give force and effect to the legislature's 
intent" and must "reconcile apparent inconsistencies between statutes if it is possible to do SO." 
State v. Gamino, 148 Idaho 827, 829-30,230 P.3d 437, 438-399 (2010). Where two statutes 
are in irreconcilable conflict, "the more recently enacted statute governs." Id Nonetheless, a 
statute is construed "under the assumption that the legislature was aware of all other statutes and 
legal precedence at the time the statute was passed." DrujJel v. State Dept. of Transp., 136 
Idaho 853, 856, 41 P.3d 739, 743 (2002). 
PAL argues the District Court erred by applying the "older statute of Section 28-9-
315(a)(l) over the newer statute of Section 11_203.,,35 The District Court disagreed with PAL's 
conclusion that Idaho Code Section 11-203 (enacted in 1991) is the more recent law, noting that 
while "an earlier version Idaho Code § 28-9-315 was originally adopted in 1967, it was 
specifically repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208 § 1.,,36 Idaho Code § 28-9-315 was enacted in 2001, 
33 R Vol. I, p. 155. 
34 R Vol. I, p. 155. 
35 PAL Appellant Brief, p. 33. 
36 R. Vol. I, p. 156. 
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and while derived from former Section 9-306(2), it is not the same law. See Official Comment 2 
to I.C. § 28-9-315 (stating "[s]ubsection(a)(1) ... derives from the former Section 9-306(2)"). 
Even if this Court determines that Sections 28-9-315 and 11-203 are in irreconcilable 
conflict and that Idaho Code § 11-203 is the more recently enacted statute, when the legislature 
enacted Section 11-203, it was presumed to have been aware of the mandate in Idaho Code § 9-
306(2) that a "security interest ... continues in collateral notwithstanding sale." The absence of 
any express consequence37 for a secured creditor who does not file a third party claim 
demonstrates the Idaho Legislature did not intend filing a third party claim under Idaho Code § 
11-203 to be mandatory. Had the legislature intended Idaho Code Section 11-203 to divest a 
secured creditor of its perfected security interest, it would have expressly provided such a result. 
B. The Doctrine of Quasi-Estoppel is Inapplicable to this Case because 
KeyBank has Consistently Asserted it has a Perfected Security Interest in the 
Collateral Prior to PAL. 
PAL argues KeyBank is now estopped, under the doctrine of quasi-estoppel, from 
asserting its security interest in the Collateral since it did not file a third party claim pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 11-203.38 As explained by this Court, 
[t]he doctrine of quasi-estoppel "prevents a party from asserting a 
right, to the detriment of another party, which is inconsistent with a 
position previously taken." This doctrine applies when: (1) the 
37 As the District Court observed, "Nowhere in [Idaho Code § 11-203] does it state that a secured 
creditor 'waives its security in the property' by failing to file a claim of exemption. Instead it 
only provides that possession of the collateral may be transferred to the sheriff. The statute 
contains no further sanctions, such as waiver, forfeiture, or postponement of the secured 
interest." R Vol. I, p. 163. 
38 PAL Appellant Brief, p. 21. 
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offending party took a different position than his or her original 
position and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an advantage 
or caused a disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was 
induced to change positions; or (c) it would be unconscionable to 
permit the offending party to maintain an inconsistent position 
from one he or she has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in. 
Atwoodv. Smith, 143 Idaho 110,114,138 P.3d 310, 314 (2006) (citations omitted). "[Q]uasi-
estoppel is essentially a last-gasp theory under which a defendant who can point to no specific 
detrimental reliance due to plaintiffs' conduct may still assert that plaintiffs are estopped from 
asserting allegedly contrary positions where it would be unconscionable for them to do so." 
Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 357, 48 P.3d 1241, 1246 (2002) (quoting 
Schoonover v. Bonner County, 113 Idaho 916, 919, 750 P.2d 95, 99 (1988)). 
PAL's quasi-estoppel argument is premised on its position that Section 11-203 
mandatorily requires a holder of a security interest in levied property to file a third party claim, 
and that failure to do so results in the secured creditor forfeiting its security interest However, as 
explained in Section A, supra, the third party claim procedure is not intended to affect a secured 
creditor's perfected interest, especially in light of Idaho Code § 28-9-315. KeyBank did not, 
contrary to PAL's assertions, take an inconsistent position with respect to its interest in the 
property levied by PAL. As outlined below, KeyBank's counsel repeatedly warned PAL that it 
had a validly perfected security interest in the Collateral and that if PAL proceeded with the sale, 
KeyBank would retain all its interest in the Collateral, including a right to the sale proceeds. 
Initially, after learning that PAL caused the Madison County Sheriff to serve a writ of 
execution and notice of attachment against its Collateral, on April 28, 2010, KeyBank's counsel 
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sent a letter to PAL's counsel enclosing a copy of its Complaint against Tri-steel, a copy of its 
DCC filing, and stating in part: 
As you can see from the enclosed UCC filing, KeyBank has 
perfected its security interest in all of this collateral described in 
the KeyBank Complaint. This UCC is on file under the name of 
the debtor, so I am having a difficult time understanding why you 
would instruct the Sheriff to seize property that clearly is subject to 
another creditor's secured interest. Indeed, when you review the 
allegation in the attached Complaint, you can readily see there is no 
equity in the property .... 
Please be advised that KeyBank takes the posItIOn that said 
property cannot be sold without permission of KeyBank and that if 
any sale of such property occurs or has occurred, KeyBank will 
retain all rights it has in the collateral, including a right to have the 
security interest transfer to the proceed[ s] of such sale.39 
Subsequently, in the days leading up to the June 9, 2010 sheriffs sale, KeyBank's 
counsel requested orally and in writing that the Sheriffs Office and PAL postpone the sale or 
hold all sale proceeds in a trust account for KeyBank. In a letter to PAL's counsel dated June 8, 
2010, KeyBank again outlined its position, stating: 
KeyBank has a perfected security interest in the personal property 
ofTri-Steel Construction Company ... [and] all proceeds from the 
sale of the property. . . . Therefore, KeyBank requests that you 
postpone the sale until we can obtain a court order regarding the 
priority of our interests in the property. If you choose to proceed 
with the sale, please instruct the Sheriffs office to hold all the sale 
proceeds in a trust account, so we can then litigate over their 
distribution. If you proceed with the sale and fail to retain the 
39 R Vol. I, p. 16, ~ 22; see also R Supp. Vol. I, p. 9, ~ 3. 
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proceeds in a trust account, KeyBank will hold PAL I fully 
responsible for its lost collateral and proceeds.4o 
Despite KeyBank's repeated objections, the June 9, 2010 sale proceeded as scheduled. It 
would therefore be illogical to hold that KeyBank is somehow estopped from asserting its 
security interest in the collateral when it expressly protested the sale. Further, any detriment 
caused to PAL from its levy and sale of KeyBank's Collateral was a result of PAL's own actions. 
Despite having notice that KeyBank claimed a security interest in the property-including notice 
of KeyBank's public VCC Financing Statement filed on April 23, 2007-PAL chose to go 
forward with the sale and incur the related expenses and risk of litigation.4 ! 
PAL further argues that the District Court's interpretation of Idaho Code § 11-203 gives 
secured creditors like KeyBank "a strong incentive never to claim security interests until after the 
sheriffs sale when they can evaluate the outcome with benefit of 20120 hindsight.,,42 As evidenced 
by the record, KeyBank clearly did not wait to assert its security interest in the Collateral "until after 
the sheriff's sale." In addition to the written notice from KeyBank's cOUflSel protesting the 
attempted Sheriff's sale, KeyBank had filed VCC statements on record notifying the world of its 
perfected security interest at all times. Moreover, while a secured creditor's rights in levied 
property are not lost if the property is sold to satisfy a judgment, as this case illustrates, it can be 
40 R Vol. I, pp. 16-18, ~ 28-32; see also R Supp. Vol. I, p. 9, ~ 4. 
41 PAL additionally had notice that two other secured creditors (Zions Bank and U.S. Bank) 
claimed an interest in certain property sold at the June 9, 2010 sheriff sale. See R. Vol. I, p. 38 
and PAL Appellant Brief, pp. 25 and 28. Again, it is PAL's actions, not the District Court's 
interpretation of Idaho Code § 11-203, that opened the door for a multiplicity of lawsuits against 
PAL as well as against persons purchasing property at the sheriff s sale. 
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difficult and expensive to bring an action to protect those rights after the property is sold without 
the creditor's consent. 
KeyBank has consistently asserted that it has a perfected security interest in the Collateral 
with priority over PAL's judgment lien, and despite knowledge of KeyBank's prior interest, PAL 
.chose to sell the Collateral to its alleged detriment. The doctrine of quasi-estoppel, which 
requires the offending party take inconsistent positions to its advantage or to the disadvantage of 
the other party, is therefore inapplicable to this case. Additionally, PAL should not be allowed to 
succeed in using quasi-estoppel to provide for a forfeiture of a secured property right when Idaho 
Code § 11-203 has not expressly provided such a result. 
c. PAL Failed to Obtain KeyBank's Written Consent, as Required by Idaho 
Code § 8-S06A, Prior to Levying KeyBank's Collateral. 
In its analysis of Idaho Code § 11-203 and Idaho Code § 28-9-315 (stating a security 
interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale "unless the secured party authorized the 
disposition free of the security interest"), the District Court properly held that KeyBank' s security 
interest survived the sheriff s sale and additionally, that PAL failed to comply with Idaho Code § 
8-506A 43 by not obtaining KeyBank's written consent prior to levying its Collateral. 
Idaho CQde § 8-506A requires a judgment creditor attaching personal property subject to 
a security interest follow a procedure that will protect and preserve the security interest. As 
explained by Section 8-506A (emphasis added): 
42 PAL Appellant Brief, p. 26. 
43 See Addendum to this Brief, attaching the full text of Idaho Code § 8-506A. 
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Personal property subject to a security interest. .. may be attached 
by the following methods, and no other: 
(a) Personal property capable of manual delivery may be attached 
by taking possession, provided all secured parties with a perfected 
security interest therein under the Idaho uniform commercial code 
consent thereto in writing, and the attachment shall be subject to 
the rights of any secured party under a perfected security 
agreement, but otherwise would be to the same effect and in the 
same manner as if the property were not subject to the security 
agreement. 
(b) If any secured party with a perfected security interest does not 
consent in writing that the sheriff take possession of the personal 
property, the attaching creditor must payor tender to the secured 
party the amount due on the security agreement before the officer 
may take the property into possession. The attaching creditor upon 
so redeeming shall be subrogated to the rights of the secured party 
under the security agreement, and the secured party shall, upon 
payment or tender assign the security agreement, note or notes so 
paid, and any filed financing statements to the attaching creditor. 
Upon any sale by judicial proceedings, any amounts owing to the 
attaching creditor on the security agreement so redeemed, with 
lawful interest thereon, shall first be paid to the attaching creditor. 
Obtaining the secured creditor's written permission (or paying the secured amount due) is 
likewise required under Idaho law prior to levying secured property under a writ of execution. See 
Fulton v. Duro, 107 Idaho 240, 687 P.2d 1367 (Ct. App. 1984). In Fulton, a creditor levied and 
executed upon some of the debtor's real estate in satisfaction of a judgment, but the sale was set 
aside because the sheriff did not comply with the requirements of Idaho Code § 8-506. While Idaho 
Code § 8-506 expressly provides the procedure for attaching real and personal property, the court in 
Fulton held that Section 8-506 also provides a mandatory procedure for levying property pursuant 
to a writ of execution. As explained by the Court in Fulton, "the legislature intended that the 
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method of levying under a writ of attachment was also to be used to levy under a writ of execution. 
'[A]ll ... property both real and personal, or any interest in either real or personal property ... may 
be attached on execution in like manner as upon writs of attachment. I.C. § 11-201.'" Id at 246. 
Here, the District Court correctly held that although Idaho Code § 8-506A expressly 
references attaching property (like Section 8-506 at issue in Fulton), the analysis in Fulton makes 
Section 8-506A also applicable to a k.vy upon execution.44 Therefore, to comply with Idaho 
Code § 8-506A, PAL should have obtained KeyBank's written permission prior to levying its 
secured Collateral. It is undisputed that KeyBank never consented in writing to PAL's actions. In 
fact, KeyBank specifically objected orally and in writing on multiple occasions. 
PAL, however, challenges the District Court and KeyBank's reliance on Fulton, asserting, 
with little analysis, that Fulton is inapplicable to this case because 1) it involves execution 
against real property, not personal property, and 2) it predates the enactment of Section 11-203 in 
1991. As explained by the District Court, these arguments lack merit: 
PAL contends that the Court erred in relying upon Fulton because 
it dealt with real property, not personal property. While it is true 
that Fulton concerned real property, it's holding was based upon a 
statute that expressly applies to both real and personal property-
I.C. § 11-201. PAL has failed to establish that this distinction 
makes a difference . 
. . . [Fulton] is primarily concerned with the procedural aspects of 
execution. However, nothing about the holding in Fulton was 
changed by the adoption of I.C. § 11-203. Further, there is no 
44 R Vol. I, p. 158. 
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reason for the Court to assume that 11-203 was a calculated and 
intentional effort to change the laws in Fulton.45 
In addition, PAL attempts to excuse its lack of compliance with Idaho Code § 8-S06A by 
arguing the "requirements of Section 8-S06A are expressly permissive.,,46 The plain language of 
Idaho Code § 8-S06A stating, "[p]ersonal property subject to a security interest ... may be 
attached by the following methods, and no other" refutes this argument. I.C. § 8-S06A 
(emphasis added). 
Despite the analysis in Fulton, PAL further argues that Idaho Code § 8-S06A only applies 
to pre-judgment attachment and not to the post-judgment writ of execution and levy at issue in 
this case. However, pursuant to Idaho Code § 8-527, the rules set forth in Idaho Code § 11-203 
also apply to a third party who has an interest in personal property that has been attached. See 
I.e. § 8-S27 ("If any personal property attached, garnished or executed upon be claimed by a 
third person as his property, or by the defendant as exempt property, the same rules shall prevail 
as to the contents and making of said claim, and as to the holding of said property, as in the case 
of a claim after levy upon execution, as provided in section 11-203, Idaho Code.") 
It would be inconsistent for the Idaho legislature to afford specific protections to preserve 
security interests in attached property while at the same time allowing a secured creditor to forfeit 
its interest in levied property simply by not filing a third party claim. Protecting the rights of 
secured creditors is especially necessary when the secured property is subject to levy under a writ 
4S I R Vo . I, pp. IS8-S9. 
46 PAL Appellant Brief, p. 38. 
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of execution since, unlike with a writ of attachment (see I.e. § 8-503), no bond is required for a 
writ of execution. A consistent interpretation of the Idaho Code regarding attachment, levy 
and/or sale of secured property is that a secured creditor, by nature of its vested property right, 
has no duty under Idaho Code § 11-203 to file a third party claim to preserve its secured interest, 
and a judgment lien creditor is obligated to obtain the secured creditor's authorization prior to 
attaching or levying the secured collateral (pursuant to Idaho Code § 8-506A) or selling the 
secured collateral free of the security interest (pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-9-315).47 Such an 
interpretation is also in keeping with effective preservation of the special right afforded a secured 
party under the UCC to "take possession of the collateral" upon default. See LC. § 28-9-609. 
The most important remedy available to a secured party is the right 
to take possession of the collateral following a debtor's default. 
After default the debtor has lost his right of possession and sale 
and retains only a contingent right in the surplus, if any, after sale. 
On default, a secured party is entitled to possession as against a 
subsequent levying creditor, for a levy cannot void the secured 
party's right to repossession. 
Murdockv. Blake, 484 P.2d 164,169 (Utah 1971). 
47 See also R Vol. I, p. 114 (District Court holding that "while the requirements of I.e. § 8-506A 
were intended to be mandatory upon levying creditors, the requirements of I.e. § 11-203 are not 
strictly enforceable against holders of a perfected security interest with priority. To hold otherwise 
would render I.e. § 8-506A meaningless. While PAL may argue that this rule now renders portions 
ofI.C. § 11-203 meaningless, the Court respectfully disagrees. Unlike I.e. § 8-506A, I.e. § 11-203 
was not intended to set forth the rights of creditors.") 
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D. The Equal Protection Clause is Inapplicable to the Interpretation of Idaho 
Code § 11-203 because Secured Creditors, Judgment Lien Creditors and 
Debtors are Not Similarly Circumstanced. 
According to PAL, the District Court interpreted Idaho Code § 11-203 in a manner that 
"gives secured creditors greater property rights than owners at the expense of judgment creditors 
like PAL" in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.48 PAL's 
argument misapplies principles of constitutional law. 
"Equal protection embraces the principle that all persons in like circumstances should 
receive the same benefits and burdens of the law." Bermudes v. Minidoka County, 141 Idaho 157, 
160, 106 P.3d 1123, 1126 (2005) (emphasis added) (citing u.s. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1). 
"Equal protection issues focus on classifications within statutory schemes that allocate benefits or 
burdens differently among the categories of persons affected. Id 
"In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires a state to govern 
impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are 
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective; thus, for example, it may not subject men and 
women to disparate treatment when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and any 
important state purpose." 16B Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 833; see also Credit Bureau of 
Eastern Idaho v. Lecheminant, 149 Idaho 467, 235 P.3d 1188 (2010) (holding Idaho Code § 11-204 
unconstitutional for treating husbands and wives unequally and finding such disparate treatment 
arbitrary and not substantially related to the objective of community property legislation). Notably, 
48 PAL Appellant Brief, p. 41. 
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"the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit states from treating different classes of people 
differently." Lecheminant, 149 Idaho at 471 (emphasis added). Further, where a situation does not 
involve a suspect class or a fundamental right, "strict scrutiny" of a law is not the appropriate 
standard. Instead, "[t]o meet the rational basis test, the statutory classification must bear a rational 
relationship to legitimate government interests" and "[t]his Court will uphold the statute if any 
conceivable set of facts support the finding of a rational relationship." State v. Avelar, 129 Idaho 
700, 703, 931 P.2d 1218, 1221 (1997)(citations omitted). 
Here, the District Court's analysis of the applicable statutes was "not based on any 
suspect classes such as gender, race or religion. It [was] merely attempting to define the rights of 
two classes of persons: perfected secured creditors and subsequent judgment creditors.,,49 
Moreover, secured creditors, judgment lien creditors and judgment debtors are different classes 
of persons and therefore the Fourteenth Amendment does not mandate that Idaho law provide 
them "equal protection." The District Court was commendably loath to adopt a reading of the 
statutes that allowed the simple failure to submit a third party claim to destroy a vested property 
right, especially when that reading would run afoul of and contradict a key provision of the UCC. 
A secured creditor (like KeyBank), has a vested property right in the debtor's pledged 
collateral and resulting sale proceeds. Article 9 of the UCC defines a "secured party" to mean "a 
person in whose favor a security interest is created or provided for under a security agreement" 
and defines a "security agreement" as simply "an agreement that creates or provides for a security 
49 R Vol. I, p. 163. 
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interest .... " I.C. § 28-9-102(72) and (73). Article 9 also defines a "debtor" as "a person having 
an interest, other than a security interest or other lien, in the collateral, whether or not the person 
is an obligor" and defines a "lien creditor" to include "a creditor that has acquired a lien on the 
property involved by attachment, levy, or the like." I.C. § 28-9-102(28) and (52). A security 
interest is only subordinate to the rights of a judgment lien creditor (like PAL) that becomes a 
judgment lien creditor before the security interest is perfected. I.C. § 28-9-317(a)(2)(A)("A 
security interest ... is subordinate to the rights of ... a person that becomes a lien creditor before 
the earlier of the time ... the security interest ... is perfected."); see also Mellor v. Pistole, 734 
F.2d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir. 1984) (A ''judgment lien creditor is not a bona fide purchaser, and 
therefore is subject to all prior interests in the property, whether known or unknown, recorded or 
unrecorded."). The Equal Protection Clause is therefore inapposite to the interpretation ofIdaho 
Code § 11-203 because secured creditors, judgment lien creditors and debtors are not "similarly 
circumstanced." Furthermore, the legislative intent of Section 11-203 is to provide judgment 
debtors with sufficient notice and opportunity to claim their entitled exemptions. The mention of 
secured creditors in that statute provides a means for those secured creditors to actively 
participate in the sale if they choose to do so.so 11-203 does not set up a trap for the unwary 
secured creditor and decree forfeiture of a valuable property right as the penalty for not filing a 
third party claim, nor does it alter the lien priority between secured creditors and judgment lien 
50 Section 11-203, as it relates to third party claims, provides an orderly means for secured 
creditors to notify the levying party and the sheriff of the amount owed the secured creditor. 
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creditors as established under Idaho's Uniform Commercial Code. While there may be other 
ways of accomplishing the necessary and proper governmental purpose of decreeing the priority 
relationship between these two classes, the UCC statute the legislature has seen fit to enact-
which is not a unique Idaho enactment but one that has found purchase in many other states as a 
standard UCC provision51-bears a rational relationship to that governmental purpose. 
E. KeyBank is Entitled to its Attorneys' Fees and Costs on Appeal. 
KeyBank requests and is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs on appeal pursuant to LA.R. 40 
and 41 and Idaho Code § 12-120(1). Idaho Code § 12-120(1) provides, " ... in any action where 
the amount pleaded is twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or less, there shall be taxed and 
allowed to the prevailing party, as part of the costs of the action, a reasonable amount to be fixed by 
the court as attorney's fees. For the plaintiff to be awarded attorney's fees, for the prosecution of 
the action, written demand for the payment of such claim must have been made on the defendant 
not less than ten (lO) days before the commencement ofthe action ... " 
In compliance with Idaho Code § 12-120(1), on April 28, 20 lO, counsel for KeyBank sent 
a written demand letter to counsel for PAL, which clearly described KeyBank's interest in the 
levied property and demanded PAL not sell the property without KeyBank's permission. 52 The 
Where a secured creditor has not authorized the levying creditor to sells its collateral free of its 
security interest, the levying creditor proceeds with sale of the collateral at its oWfi peril. 
51 Cf, Idaho Code § 28-1-103(a) (stating that "underlying purposes and policies" of the uniform 
commercial code include "to simplifY, clarifY and modernize the law governing commercial 
transactions; to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, 
and agreement of the parties; and to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions."). 
52 R Vol. I, pp. 16 and 37-38; see also R Supp. Vol. I, p. 9, ~ 3. 
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letter further warns PAL that if it causes "KeyBank to have to take further steps to act to protect 
its collateral ... KeyBank will likely seek an award of costs and fees.,,53 On August 16,2010, 
KeyBank filed a Complaint requesting the Court order PAL to pay over to KeyBank all sale 
proceeds it received from sale of its collateral. The amount plead was $16,884.41 in sale 
proceeds, based on the accounting provided by the Sheriffs office. 54 KeyBank is therefore 
entitled to its costs and attorneys' fees on appeal. 
v. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, KeyBank National Association respectfully requests this Court 
uphold the District Court's decision and award KeyBank its costs and attorneys' fees in regard to 
this appeal. 
DATED this 27th day of December, 2011. 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
By:~1fJ~ 
Thomas E. Dvorak 
Amber N. Dina 
Attorneys for PlaintifflRespondent KeyBank 
53Id 
54 R Vol. I, p. 18, ~ 35-36; see also R Supp. Vol. I, p. 25; ~ 4. 
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Westlaw. 
I.e. § 28-9-315 
c 
West's Idaho Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 28. Commercial Transactions 
"III Chapter 9. Secured Transactions 
"III Part 3. Perfection and Priority 
.... § 28-9-315. Secured party's rights on disposition of collateral and in proceeds 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter and in section 28-2-403(2): 
Page 1 
(1) A security interest or agricultural lien continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, lease, license, exchange 
or other disposition thereof unless the secured party authorized the disposition free of the security interest or 
agricuIturallien; and 
(2) A security interest attaches to any identifiable proceeds of collateral. 
(b) Proceeds that are commingled with other property are identifiable proceeds: 
(1) If the proceeds are goods, to the extent provided by section 28-9-336; and 
(2) If the proceeds are not goods, to the extent that the secured party identifies the proceeds by a method of 
tracing, including application of equitable principles, that is permitted under law other than this chapter with 
respect to commingled property of the type involved. 
(c) A security interest in proceeds is a perfected security interest if the security interest in the original collateral 
was perfected. 
(d) A perfected security interest in proceeds becomes unperfected on the twenty-first day after the security in-
terest attaches to the proceeds unless: 
(1) The following conditions are satisfied: 
(A) a filed financing statement covers the original collateral; 
(B) the proceeds are collateral in which a security interest may be perfected by filing in the office in which 
the financing statement has been filed; and 
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(C) the proceeds are not acquired with cash proceeds; 
(2) The proceeds are identifiable cash proceeds; or 
(3) The security interest in the proceeds is perfected other than under subsection (c) of this section when the 
security interest attaches to the proceeds or within twenty (20) days thereafter. 
(e) If a filed financing statement covers the original collateral, a security interest in proceeds which remains per-
fected under subsection (d) (1) of this section becomes unperfected at the later of: 
(1) When the effectiveness of the filed financing statement lapses under section 28-9-515 or is terminated un-
der section 28-9-513; or 
(2) The twenty-first day after the security interest attaches to the proceeds. 
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Westlaw. 
I.e. § 8-506A Page 1 
c 
West's Idaho Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 8. Provisional Remedies in Civil Actions 
"'iii Chapter 5. Attachments and Garnishments 
.... § 8-506A. Attachment of a debtor's interest in personal property subject to security agree-
ment--Attachment of defendant's interest in mortgage or trust deed--Attachment of defendant's in-
terest in security agreement 
Personal property subject to a security interest, a defendant's equity of redemption in personal property and a de-
fendant's interest in a real estate mortgage or deed of trust or as secured party under a security agreement may be 
attached by the following methods, and no other: 
(a) Personal property capable of manual delivery may be attached by taking possession, provided all secured 
parties with a perfected security interest therein under the Idaho uniform commercial code consent thereto in 
writing, and the attachment shall be subject to the rights of any secured party under a perfected security agree-
ment, but otherwise would be to the same effect and in the same manner as if the property were not subject to 
the security agreement. 
(b) If any secured party with a perfected security interest does not consent in writing that the sheriff take posses-
sion of the personal property, the attaching creditor must payor tender to the secured party the amount due on 
the security agreement before the officer may take the property into possession. The attaching creditor upon so 
redeeming shall be subrogated to the rights of the secured party under the security agreement, and the secured 
party shall, upon payment or tender assign the security agreement, note or notes so paid, and any filed financing 
statements to the attaching creditor. Upon any sale by judicial proceedings, any amounts owing to the attaching 
creditor on the security agreement so redeemed, with lawful interest thereon, shall first be paid to the attaching 
creditor. 
(c) If the attaching creditor so elects and instructs the sheriff, the equity of redemption of the defendant in the 
personal property subject to a perfected security agreement shall be attached. Such attachment is made by 
serving upon the secured party, upon the defendant, and upon the person in possession of the property, if other 
than the defendant or secured party, if said parties can be found within the county where the property is situated, 
a copy of the writ of attachment, together with a notice signed by the sheriff, describing the property attached, 
giving the name of the secured party, and stating the interest of the defendant in the property attached, and by 
causing the notice to be filed in the office where a security agreement or financing statement on said property 
should be filed to perfect the security according to the Idaho uniform commercial code or other applicable law. 
The sheriff shall make the filing by mail if in an office outside his county, and shall also file with the notice in 
any office where a financing statement should be filed for the property, a financing statement describing the 
property attached, the prior security agreement, and signed by the attaching creditor or his agent as secured party 
and for the defendant as debtor by the sheriff. The filing officer shall receive and file the financing statement 
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and index the same pursuant to part 5, chapter 9, title 28, Idaho Code. Service and filing as above provided shall 
operate as an attachment of the property described in the notice, subject to the prior rights of the secured party 
under the security agreement; possession of the property shall not be taken by the sheriff. Compliance with the 
foregoing is constructive notice to the world of the attachment. Provided, however, that this section shall not be 
constructive notice to a bona fide purchaser for value of any motor vehicle who has actual or constructive pos-
session of the vehicle and who has relied on the certificate of title for determination by said purchaser as to se-
cured parties shown thereon; nothing in this section shall relieve any person from complying with section 
49-504, Idaho Code. 
When the sale of such property attached under this subsection (c) is made on writ of execution obtained by such 
creditor, the proceeds must be applied as in the case of any other execution sale. The purchaser at any such sale 
acquires all title and rights of the judgment debtor in the property sold, as of the time the attachment was levied, 
subject to the perfected security agreement including all liens if any thereunder, securing obligations to be cre-
ated after the security agreement was made in cases where such obligations have actually been created, and are 
by law entitled to priority over attaching creditors, and is entitled to the possession of such property subject, 
however, to the rights of the secured party. 
Any transfer of encumbrance of the attached interest of the debtor-defendant is void as against the attaching 
creditor, but this provision shall not be construed as forbidding or invalidating any transfer or disposition of the 
property lawfully made pursuant to the prior security agreement, or any other right exercised or acquired there-
under. 
(d) Any interest of the defendant as mortgagee of a real estate mortgage or beneficiary of a trust deed on real es-
tate whether held directly or as an assignee, may be attached. The sheriff must record with the county recorder 
where the real property is located a copy of the writ along with a notice in writing, naming the defendant, de-
scribing the real property, and identifying the recording information on the real estate mortgage or trust deed, 
and stating that the defendant's interest therein is attached, and by serving copies of the notice and writ upon the 
defendant and upon the mortgagor of the mortgage or trustor of the trust deed if they can be located within the 
county where the property is located. The recorder shall index the same as an assignment of the defendant's in-
terest in the mortgage or deed of trust, and it shall be constructive notice to the world of the attachment. The at-
tachment shall be subject to the rights of a holder in due course of a note or notes secured by the mortgage or 
trust deed, whether acquired before or after the attachment. 
(e) Any interest of the defendant as secured party of a security agreement, whether held directly or as an assign-
ee, shall be attached by the sheriff filing with the filing office where the security agreement or financing state-
ment pursuant thereto is or should by law be filed, a copy of the writ along with a notice in writing, naming the 
defendant, describing the property listed in the financing statement or filed security statement, identifying the 
parties to the security agreement, and stating that the defendant's interest therein is attached. The sheriff shall 
serve a copy of the notice and writ upon the defendant and upon the debtor under the security agreement, if they 
can be located within the county where the property is located. The sheriff may file the copy of the writ or notice 
by mail if the filing officer is outside the county. The filing officer shall index the same as an assignment of the 
defendant's interest in the security agreements, and it shall be constructive notice to the world. The attachment 
shall be subject to the rights of a holder in due course of a note or notes secured by the security agreement, 
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Westlaw. 
I.e. § 11-203 Page I 
c 
West's Idaho Code Annotated Currentness 
Title II. Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Actions 
"IiI Chapter 2. Property Subject to Execution--Exemptions 
...... § 11-203. Claim of exemption by defendant or third party claim--Motion to contest claim and 
hearing--Holding and release of property by sheriff 
The following procedures shall apply to a claim by the defendant or the defendant's representative that property 
levied upon is exempt and to any claim by a third party that property levied upon is his property or that he has a 
security interest therein. The defendant or the defendant's representative shall complete the claim of exemption 
form as provided in section 8-507C, Idaho Code. A third party claimant shall prepare a written claim setting 
forth the grounds upon which he claims the property, and in the case of a secured party, also stating the dollar 
amount of the claim. A claim of exemption or third party claim may be filed only if property has been levied 
upon. 
(a) The claim of exemption or third party claim shall be delivered or mailed to the sheriff within fourteen (14) 
days after the date the sheriff hand delivers or mails the documents required to be served upon the defendant and 
third parties under section 8-507 A, Idaho Code. If the claim is mailed, it must be received by the sheriff within 
the fourteen (14) day period. In computing the fourteen (14) day period, intervening weekends and legal holi-
days shall be counted, but if the last day of the period falls on a weekend or legal holiday, the period shall be 
deemed to run until the close of business of the first business day following the weekend or holiday. 
Within one (1) business day after receiving a claim, the sheriff shall deliver or mail a copy thereof to the 
plaintiff or other person in whose favor the writ of execution runs. The sheriff may provide notification of the 
claim by telephone but must also mail a copy of the claim within one (1) business day as herein provided. 
(b) The plaintiff or other person in whose favor the writ of execution runs shall have five (5) business days after 
the date a copy of the claim is delivered or mailed to him by the sheriff within which to file a motion with the 
court stating the grounds upon which he contests the claim of exemption or third party claim. When the motion 
is filed, the plaintiff shall lodge with the court a copy of the claim to which the motion pertains. Hearing on the 
motion shall be set for a date within not less than five (5) nor more than twelve (12) days after the filing date of 
the motion and may be continued only at the request of the defendant. A copy of the motion and notice of hear-
ing shall be delivered or mailed to the defendant or third party claimant on the date the motion is filed. The pre-
vailing party at the hearing may be awarded costs pursuant to the Idaho rules of civil procedure. 
Within the period for filing a motion to contest, the moving party shall notify the sheriff that the motion has 
been filed. Such notification may be by telephone but a copy of the motion and notice of hearing shall also be 
mailed or hand delivered to the sheriff within the filing period herein prescribed. 
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(c) The sheriff shall not deliver to the plaintiff or sell the property levied upon, except if perishable as provided 
by law, until the period for filing a claim has elapsed. The sheriff shall refuse to accept or honor a claim not 
filed with him within that period and unless otherwise ordered by the court, shall, after such period has elapsed, 
proceed to sell or deliver the property levied upon to the plaintiff or other person in whose favor the execution 
runs. If, after notice from the sheriff of the filing of a claim, the plaintiff or other person in whose favor the exe-
cution runs, notifies the sheriff that the claim will be uncontested or fails to notify the sheriff within the time 
provided in subsection (b) of this section that the claim is being contested, the sheriff shall release the claimed 
property to the defendant or his agent. 
(d) If a plaintiff or other person in whose favor the execution runs has failed to contest a claim of exemption 
within the time allowed by this section or if property has been determined by a court to be exempt, and the 
plaintiff or other person in whose favor the execution runs thereafter levies upon or otherwise seeks to apply the 
property toward the satisfaction of the same money judgment, the plaintiff or other person in whose favor the 
execution runs is not entitled to recover the subsequent costs of collection unless the property is applied to satis-
faction of the judgment. 
(e) If a security agreement to the third party claimant is in default, rendering said claimant the legal right to pos-
session, the claimant may file with the sheriff an affidavit of release to the claimant executed by the defendant-debt-
or, or his agent; or, in lieu of said affidavit of release, the third party claimant may file an affidavit setting forth 
the defendant-debtor's default and claiming possession under default and a hold harmless agreement in favor of 
the sheriff, supported by an undertaking qualifying in the state of Idaho, indemnifying the sheriff and said de-
fendant-debtor in double the actual value of the property as stated in said third party claim. Upon receipt of 
either of the foregoing, the sheriff shall release said property to the third party claimant, taking receipt therefor; 
these proceedings to be reported to the court by sheriffs return in the action. 
(£) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the defendant from pursuing his common law remedies. 
(g) Personal service shall be accomplished in the same manner provided for service of summons under the Idaho 
rules of civil procedure. Mailing shall be by first class mail. The date when an item is deposited in the United 
States mails shall constitute the date of mailing. In computing any period of time prescribed in this section, the 
day of the act or event after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included. 
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